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Abstract: We examine Carruthers’s proposal that sentences in logical form
serve to create flexibility within central system modularity, enabling the
combination of information from different modalities. We discuss evi-
dence from aphasia and the neurobiology of input-output systems. This
work suggests that there exists considerable capacity for interdomain cog-
nitive processing without language mediation. Other challenges for a log-
ical form account are noted.
Peter Carruthers provides an elegant tour across the landscape of
competing claims on the role of language in human cognition. This
in itself is a complex undertaking, in view of the still limited evi-
dence. For example, the evidence from aphasia only provides a
window on the role of language in the mature cognitive system and
says nothing as to how language might sculpt a distinctively hu-
man cognitive architecture. Hence a whole class of “diachronic”
claims regarding the effects of language on cognition lie outside
of the scope of the evidence from aphasia. Moreover, the evidence
from aphasia studies of either associations or dissociations be-
tween language impairment and other cognitive functions should
be interpreted with caution. Evidence of associations – for exam-
ple, between aphasia and an inability to generate alternative strate-
gies on a problem-solving task (Varley 2002; Varley et al. 2001) – falls
far short of what is needed to draw causal inferences. Associations
may result from naturally occurring brain lesions crossing the
boundaries of the neural substrates of processing systems; the as-
sociation is then an anatomical coincidence rather than a causal 
relationship in which language gives rise to cognition. Equally, dis-
sociations between language impairment in aphasia and the spar-
ing of cognitive performance in other domains such as space and
number require careful consideration. In many studies, either the
nature and extent of linguistic impairment are not clearly specified,
or the abilities that are specified are such that the aphasic individ-
uals have considerable residual language capacity still available to
them that could support cognition. This capacity would be suffi-
cient to generate simple “proto-language” – a language that is char-
acterized by combinatorial properties but does not have the full
features of a mature grammatical system (Bickerton 1981).
The proposal of massive central system modularity requires a
mechanism that allows flexibility between domains of cognition.
Although the notion of modularity is subject to different inter-
pretations (e.g., Coltheart 1999; Fodor 1983), it is widely ac-
knowledged that this must involve core characteristics such as do-
main specificity, informational encapsulation, and a proprietary
operating code. However, flexibility and fluidity characterizes hu-
man cognition, particularly in higher-level reasoning and problem
solving; hence the requirement for a cognitive lingua franca to
combine the outputs of the modular subsystems. For Carruthers,
the central code that permits the combination of outputs is logi-
cal form – the abstract, deep structural representations that un-
derlie natural language sentences.
There are a number of possible reasons to reject the claim that
natural language in the form of logical form sentences is the mech-
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anism for intermodular combination. For example, the nature of
the brain architecture of input-output systems permits intermodal
mixing at an early stage in information processing. Sensory-per-
ceptual systems consist of batteries of micromodules that respond
only to very specific inputs (e.g., the tonatopic organization of the
primary auditory cortex). However, zones of association cortex,
described as polymodal areas, surround primary sensory cortices.
Association cortex receives inputs from a number of micromod-
ules within a sensory domain such as vision or from different sen-
sory domains. Tasks such as those of Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999)
that require the combination of visual object and geometric in-
formation are central to Carruthers’s thesis on the relation be-
tween language and cognition. However, responses in such tasks
could be achieved by a lower-level nonlinguistic perceptual mech-
anism. Evidence from language training studies that result in ac-
curate spatial cognition could reflect a co-opted strategic resource
that is sufficient to assist performance on a range of problem-solv-
ing tasks, including theory of mind (Siegal & Varley 2002). There
is debate about the extent of association cortex, with the sugges-
tion that as perception is gradually fractionated into further mi-
cromodules, more of what is believed to be polymodal cortex may
be reclassified as primary, sensory cortex (Kaas 1999). However, it
is well established that the architecture of sensory-perceptual cor-
tices permits the integration of information from different do-
mains at an early stage in cognitive processing.
Another neurobiological example of interdomain information
combination involves mirror neuron systems. These are cells in mo-
tor regions that fire when an action is observed, thus providing a
mechanism for input-output linkage again at a low level of infor-
mation processing (Rizzolatti et al. 2001). Both polymodal associa-
tion cortex and mirror neuron systems show that the brain is
equipped with mechanisms to permit combination of interdomain
information at an early stage in information processing. These
neural systems are intrinsic to input-output modules and are remote
both anatomically and functionally from central cognitive systems.
There are other difficulties at both the theoretical and empiri-
cal levels for an account based on central modularity. For exam-
ple, Carruthers’s account suggests that the language faculty gen-
erates logical form (LF) sentences in response to inputs from a
range of central modules. This is a problem because now a fun-
damental criterion for modularity appears to be violated in that
the language production system is able to take as input a multi-
plicity of codes from a range domain-specific modules. The lan-
guage faculty, or at least its output component, then becomes an
omnipotent domain-general system, and Carruthers’s attempt to
develop the thesis of central system modularity results in a break-
out of domain generality elsewhere in cognition.
We conclude by noting that an LF account poses a considerable
challenge for experimental research. Imagine a set of results from
a Hermer-Vazquez et al. type of task in which one subgroup of
people with aphasia shows the ability to combine landmark and
geometric information whereas others do not. In our laboratory,
we have carried out a pilot study involving persons with severe
aphasia in which the Hermer-Vazquez et al. room procedure is
scaled down to a table-top box. In this task, rather than disorien-
tating the patient, the box is spun. Our subjects were capable of
utilizing both landmark and geometric cues in locating a hidden
object, pointing to the sparing of their spatial cognition. They
could find objects under conditions of no concurrent activity as
well as in a simple lexical verbal shadowing condition where resid-
ual lexical capacity was engaged by the concurrent activity. As the
aphasic participants had a profound impairment of their public
language, a counter to these results could be that, at a deep and
underlying level, the LF representation was intact. It is difficult to
determine how the integrity or otherwise of LF representations
could be established, given that evaluation of language processing
at both implicit and explicit levels requires the capacity to process
surface form. Similarities in aphasic impairments across input and
output modalities may be seen to indicate a loss of central lan-
guage competence. But this inference is an imprecise and indirect
metric of the integrity of logical form. An alternative account
might postulate parallel input-output impairments – resulting in
disturbance of public language that would mimic a central com-
petence deficit. Thus a crucial element in the evaluation of Car-
ruthers’s model must be whether it generates testable hypotheses.
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